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NOTES AND COMMENTS
sable, to be erroneous and reversible upon appeal. 19 Moreover, two
suits had begun following two successive settlements, and the court
felt that a mere defense to the pending action would not effectively
prevent the repetition of this persistent persecution. Finally, the New
York court has since reversed an injunction against an action pend-
ing, in violation of a settlement, in another branch of the supreme court;
compelled resort to a defense in that action, even though the complaint
therein attacked the character of the plaintiff -in the injunction suit;
and restricted the Bomeisler case to its special facts.20
It is submitted that the principal case unnecessarily complicates the
North Carolina procedure. PHILIP E. LuCAS.
Receiverships-Priority of Operating Expenses Over
Secured Creditors in the Corpus.
At the instance of parties other than the secured creditors a lumber
corporation was put in the hands of a receiver with authority to con*-
tinue the business. The court ordered the receiver to sell certain
lumber, which was the sole asset of the company, and which had been
pledged to appellants (secured creditors). The court further ordered
the receiver to retain twenty percent of the money realized from the sale
to pay the expenses of the receivership and to remit the balance to the
secured creditors. Held, order affirmed. Where a receivership enures
to the benefit of a lienholder, his lien is subordinate to the adminis-
trative expenses.'
In Fosdick v. Schal,2 the United States Supreme Court adopted the
rule that in railroad receiverships the operating expenses have a priority
in payment out of the current income over the mortgagees of the corpus,
and a payment to the mortgagees out of the current income is a diver-
sion which gives the operating expenses a priority on the corpus equal
in amount to the diversion. The court declared that railroads were
affected with such vital public interest that they were obligated to con-
tinue operation. This rule has been unanimously followed as to rail-
roads,3 and later cases have added that if the current income be in-
"o Erie Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y, 637 (1871) ; Burke v. Burke, 212 N. Y.
303, 106 N. E. 62 (1914).20 Burke v. Burke, 212 N. Y. 303, 106 N. E. 62 (1914).
'Wood v. Woodbury & Pace, Inc., 217 N. C. 356, 8 S. E. (2d) 240 (1940).
299 U. S. 235, 25 L. ed. 339 (1878).
'Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct. 675, 28 L. ed. 596 (1884);
Calhoun v. St. Louis & S. E. Ry., 14 Fed. 9 (C. C. D. Ind. 1880); Clark v.
Central R. R. & Banking Co., 66 Fed. 803 (C. C. A. 5th, 1895); Central Bk.
& Tr. Co. v. Greenville & Western R. R., 248 Fed. 350 (W. D. S. C. 1918);
Central Tr. Co. of N. Y. v. Pittsburg S. & N. R. R., 223 N. Y. 347, 119
N. E. 565 (1918) ; MclIlhemey v. Bing, 80 Tex. 4, 13 S. W. 655 (1890); Belling-
ham Bay Improv. Co. v. Fairhaven & N. W. Ry., 17 Wash. 371, 49 Pac. 514(1897).
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sufficient to meet the expenses of operation under the receivership, then
they shall be a prior lien on the property itself. 4 However, it has been
pointed out that this latter doctrine is based on an extraordinary equi-
table power and is to be limited to cases where the public is interested
in the continued operation of the business.5 The majority of courts
have extended this doctrine to other public utilities0 such as telegraph
companies,7 canal companies,8 and power and water companies.0 At
this point there is a split of authority because other courts have held
the doctrine inapplicable in cases other than those involving railroads.10
Since the rule has been. held not to embrace other public utilities or
quasi-public utilities, some courts have refused to apply it in cases in-
volving gas companies" and electric power companies.12
When attempts were made to include strictly private corporations
within the rule, the majority of courts deemed themselves without the
power to do so.' 3 A New Jersey court' 4 went so far as to say, "The
general power to authorize the issue of receiver's certificates of in-
debtedness for the purpose of continuing a business which exists in the
case of a public corporation does not exist in the case of a private
corporation. When a receiver is appointed of a private corporation, the
court may authorize him to continue the business temporarily, but with
the purpose of winding up, provided that the receiver has in his pos-
session sufficient assets to enable him to go on; but if he should find it
necessary to borrow money with which to continue the business, the
'Meyer Rubber Co. v. Georgetown & W. R. R., 174 Fed. 731 (C. C. E. D,
S. C. 1909); Central Tr. Co. v. Thurman, 94 Ga. 735, 20 S. E. 141 (1894);
Standard Steel Works Co. v. Williams, 155 Ga. 177, 116 S. E. 636 (1923);
Craver v. Greer, 107 Tex. 356, 179 S. W. 862 (1916).
'Craver v. Greer, 107 Tex. 356, 179 S. W. 862 (1916).
81 CLARK, REcEiavRs (2d ed. 1929) §470 (a).
TKeelyn v. Carolina Mutual Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 Fed. 29 (C. C. D. S. C.
1898).
' Hewitt v. Great Western Beet Sugar Co., 20 Idaho 235, 118 Pac. 296(1911).
'Citizens Tr. Co. v. Nat'l Equipment & Supply Co., 178 Ind. 167, 98 N. E.
865 (1912).
"o Farmers Loan & Tr. Co. v. Burbank Power & Water Co., 196 Fed. 539
(E. D. Wash. 1912); Belknap Savings Bank v. Lamar Land & Canal Co., 28
Colo. 326, 64 Pac. 12 (1901); Central Tr. & Savings Bank v. Chester County
Electric Co., 9 Del. Ch. 247, 80 Ati. 801 (1911) ; Wiggins v. Neversink Light &
Power Co., 47 Misc. 315, 93 N. Y. Supp. 853 (Sup. Ct., 1905); McDermott v.
Pentrass Gas Co., 82 W. Va. 230, 95 S. E. 841 (1918).McDermott v. Pentrass Gas Co., 82 W. Va. 230, 95 S. E. 841 (1918).
Farmers Loan & Tr. Co. v. Burbank Power & Water Co., 196 Fed. 539
(E. D. Wash. 1912).
" Hanna v. State Tr. Co., 70 Fed. 2 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895); Smith v. Shenan-
doah Valley Nat'l Bank, 246 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); Standley v. Hendrie
& Bolthoff Mfg. Co., 27 Colo. 331, 61 Pac. 600 (1900); Oldroyd v. McCrea,
65 Utah 142, 235 Pac. 580 (1925); 1 CLAR,- REcEIVERSHIPS (2d ed. 1929)§470 (b).
"
4Lockport Felt Co. v. United Box Board & Paper Co., 76 N. J. Eq. 686,
70 At. 980 (Ch., 1908).
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rule undoubtedly is that he should not be authorized to issue receiver's
certificates to raise money therefor, which shall displace the lien 6f a
subsisting encumbrance. The reason for this is very obvious. It
would be a violation of that clause of the Federal Constitution which
prohibits the states from passing laws violative of the obligations of
contract."' 5  Other courts do not deem themselves without the power
to order the business continued in cases of private corporations, but
are reluctant to act.16 This is due to a feeling ". . . that the issuance
of receiver's certificates in the case of private enterprise is not a sound
exercise of judgment, rather than to any conclusion that they lack the
power to issue certificates in such cases. Indeed the failure to dis-
tinguish between the power to issue and the propriety of issuing re-
ceiver's certificates has led to some confusion. Fundamentally the courts
have as much right to issue receiver's certificates in the case of a strictly
private enterprise as in the case of a quasi-public one."'1  But regard-
less of theory, most courts refuse to allow the receiver of a private
corporation to issue certificates with a prior lien on the corpus ahead
of the mortgagees.' s
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet declared the
doctrine inapplicable as to private corporations, but lower federal courts
uniformly hold with the majority. 19 It is a fear of abridging the
mortgage contract and of taking the mortgagee's property right, his
security, that causes these courts to proceed with the greatest caution
in cases involving quasi-public utilities and to reject the doctrine where
private corporations are involved.
North Carolina, in an early case, followed the rule of the ma-
jority,20 refusing to apply the doctrine to private corporations. In
that case a receiver was appointed for a lumber corporation, with
authority to take charge of all the corporate property. The receiver,
pursuant to this authority, attempted to take possession of lumber in
the hands of a creditor who held subject to a mechanic's lien. The court,
upholding the creditor, said: "His lien, if he has one, appears to have
attached to the lumber before the appointment of the receiver, and he
has the clear right under sectiorn 1783 of The Code to the full amount
of any lien he may be entitled to, free from any possible or probable
charges which might be fixed upon it, if it went into the hands of a
receiver, for costs and expenses of the suit including the receiver's
Id. at 690, 70 Atl. at 981.1 In re Holmes Mfg. Co., 19 F. (2d) 239 (D. Conn. 1927) ; Glenn v. Martin,
208 Ala. 247, 94 So. 351 (1922) ; Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 273 Pac. 933 (1929).
" Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 234, 273 Pac. 933, 935 (1929).
't See notes 13 and 16, supra.
10 Note (1926) 40 A. L. R. 244, 247.
' Huntsman Bros. & Co. v. Linville River Co., 122 N. C. 583, 29 S. E. 838
(1898).
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charges." 2 1 This rule was later recognized in a strong dictum: "the
doctrine of Fosdick v. Schall seems to be restricted to railroads and
similar, or quasi, corporations. The weight of authority is that the
rule applicable to railroad cases in regard to the displacement of the
lien of the mortgage does not extend to private corporations ...
'Where the parties are all before the court, and do not object, and where
it is necessary to put the property in a marketable shape, it seems that
the court may authorize the payment of claims in preference to mort-
gage liens. But the weight of authority holds that it is not the province
of a court of equity to undertake the management of a private business,
and to create liens thereon without the consent of the mortgagee, and
that it cannot displace the lien of the mortgage where the mortgagee
asserts an independent title under his instrument of mortgage giving him
the right of possession'." 22  One year after this decision, North Caro-
lina ignored this rule. In Armour & Company v. Peoples Laundry
Co.,23 where a receiver was appointed on a creditor's bill to wind up an
insolvent laundry corporation, the court authorized the receiver to
carry on the business by the issuance of certificates which were given a
priority in the corpus ahead of the mortgagee. This was done despite
the fact that the mortgagee did not consent to the proceeding. The
court cited no authority; neither did it attempt to limit the power
to allow receivership expenses a priority in the corpus ahead of the
mortgagee in other or similar situations. North Carolina had enacted
a statute fifteen years before, which was not mentioned in the decision.
The statute provides: "Before distribution of the assets of an insolvent
corporation among the creditors or stockholders, the court shall allow
a reasonable compensation to the receiver for his services, not to
exceed five percent upon receipts and disbursements, and the cost and
expenses of administration of his trust and of the proceeding in said
court, to be first paid out of said assets." 24 The court in the foregoing
case may have adhered to the statute as a basis for its decision.
However, the statute fails to explain the Armour case, since it was
also in force at the time of the earlier dictum which pronouncea a
contrary view. What, then, is the basis for the Armour case? A
privately owned laundry is obviously not a public utility affected with
21Id. at 586, 29 S. E. at 839. Code section today is N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §2435, which provides, as it did then, for the securing of me-
chanic's liens.
"See Roberts v. Bowen Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 27, 32, 85 S. E. 45, 48 (1915).
2-8 171 N. C. 681, 89 S. E. 19 (1916). The case of Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho
229, 273 Pac. 993 (1929), cites this North Carolina case with others to demon-
strate the right of a court to authorize receiver's certificates where the purpose is
other than the preservation of the property, but provided no vested interests arc
disturbed.
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1215.
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a public interest. The court does not say that the issuance of the
receiver's certificates was essential to the preservation of the property
pending liquidation. It merely says that protection of the fund de-
manded that the property be placed in the hands of a receiver and so
managed as to produce the best results for the creditors. The court
in this case seems to have limited its concern to the unsecured creditors,
to the unreasonable detriment of the secured creditors who had loaned
money to the corporation in reliance on the supposed security which a
mortgage gives.
A later case, concerning a private corporation, involved the relative
priority of claims growing out of a receivership obtained by a simple
contract creditor without objection. 25 The following order of priorities
was observed: the mortgages existing on the property at the time of
purchase and the purchase money mortgages, the court costs and ex-
penses of receivership, claims for labor incurred prior to the receiver-
ship, tort claims accruing prior to the receivership, and finally, the claim
of the mortgagees under mortgages executed by the corporation prior
to the receivership. The purchase money mortgage gained its priority
on the theory that whenever property is acquired by a purchase money
mortgage the vendee never has the legal title but only the equity of
redemption. The expenses of the receivership achieved priority under
C. S. 1215, previously referred to. The claims for tort and labor took
priority by virtue of a statute,26 in existence at the time, which provided
that mortgages of corporate property did not take priority over execu-
tions on tort or labor judgments against the corporation. The ordinary
mortgages of the corporation are placed last on the list of priorities on
the theory that one who takes a mortgage on corporation property does
so with the knowledge of these statutes. It is to be noted that the court
applied C. S. 1215 as applying to expenses incurred by operation of the
business in receivership.
The majority of courts have recognized two exceptions to the rule
that the doctrine is inapplicable to private corporations. Expenses may
be placed ahead of secured creditors: first where the expenses were
necessary to preserve the property from deterioration pending the liqui-
dation27 and, second, where the secured creditors consent.2 8  As above
shown, North Carolina at times has failed to recognize the rule at all.
Assuming that it recognizes the rule, it apparently, by the principal case
" Humphrey Bros. v. Buell-Crocker Lumber Co., 174 N. C. 514, 93 S. E.
971 (1917).
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1140. This was formerly contained in
two sections but has been incorporated into one and amended to apply only to
public service corporations.
" Note (1909) 7 MicH. L. REv. 239.
. 1 CLARK, REcEIrasHips (2d ed. 1929) §477.
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and a previous one,29 has added a third exception, namely, that if the
court feels an operating receivership will enure to the benefit of the
secured creditors by making the liquidation of the assets more suc-
cessful, either by selling them in the usual course of business rather
than by a forced sale or by caring for them pending the sale, then
the court is justified in granting a receivership with the expenses being
first paid out of the fund realized by the sale, although the secured
creditor did not consent thereto.
Where the majority rule is ignored, as in the Armour case, general
creditors of a private corporation are allowed to try the experiment of a
receivership with authority to operate the business in the hope that the
business can be made to pay under the receivership, although it failed
to do so under its officers. This is done at the expense of the non-
consenting secured creditors if the experiment is a failure.
CLAUD WHEATLY, JR.
Taxation-Alimony Trusts-Power of Divorce Court to
Modify as Determining Settlor's Taxability.
In the recent case of Helvering v. Fuller,1 a wife obtained a Nevada
divorce, the decree incorporating and approving a pre-divorce agree-
ment. The agreement provided for an irrevocable trust, created by the
husband, income from which was payable to the wife for ten years for
her support and maintenance, when the corpus was to become hers abso-
lutely; for other property settlements; and for waiver by each of all
claims against the other. Held: Trust income was not taxable to the
husband.
In the companion case of Helvering v. Leonard,2 a wife obtained a
New York divorce, the decree incorporating and approving a pre-divorce
agreement. The agreement provided for the creation by the husband
of an irrevocable trust comprised partly of bonds the principal and
interest of which he guaranteed. The trust income 3 was payable to the
wife for life for her support and maintenance, corpus to be held for
their children on her death. Held: The trust income was taxable to the
husband.
Why this disparity in tax liability growing out of facts essentially
similar, differing only in minor -detail? The opinion in the Leonard
case relies on two distinguishing characteristics which determine the
issue: 1st-Taxpayer Leonard guaranteed the principal and interest on
"' Bank of Pinehurst v. Mid-Pines Country Club, Inc., 208 N. C. 239, 179
S. E. 882 (1935).
1 310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 84 L. ed. 715 (1940).
-310 U. S. 80, 60 Sup. Ct. 780, 84 L. ed. 721 (1940).
'$5000 a year was to be paid to each of three children, remaining amount to
the wife.
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